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Children's Rights: The Destruction 
and Promise of Family 
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse* 
In her report, Individualism and Communitarianism: Indi- 
vidual, Family and State in Western Europe, Professor Marie 
Th6rhse Meulders-Klein chronicles sweeping changes in the law 
and sociology of European families. These changes, which are 
evidenced by rising rates of divorce, single parenthood, and the 
erosion of marriage as an  institution,' are even more pro- 
nounced in the United States than in E u r ~ p e . ~  I have neither 
the erudition nor the time and space to equal Professor Meuld- 
ers-Klein's comprehensive and subtle discussion. Let me offer, 
instead, my own peculiarly American perspective-as an advo- 
cate for children operating in an urban American land- 
scap-n some of the themes of individualism and communit- 
arianism which she describes so well. 
In America, much of the blame for the breakdown of the 
traditional family has been laid at the door of excessive individ- 
ualism. I will argue, however, that the breakdown of family 
structures is not simply a product of self-centered individual- 
ism or legal laissez-faire. It has been driven, in large part, by 
respect for children and a growing reluctance to punish chil- 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. 
1. Professor Marie Th6rbse Meulders-Klein suggests that this so-called break- 
down or crisis of family is the product of hybrid tendencies horn of the tensions 
between individual, family and state-on the one hand, to protect individual liberty 
and, on the other hand, to protect vulnerable family members. Marie T. Meulders- 
Klein, Zndividualism et communautarisme: L'Zndividu, la famille et L'Etat en Eu- 
rope occidentale, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645, 659-60. See, e.g., David Blankenhorn, 
American Family Dilemmas, in REBUILDING THE NEST: A NEW COMMITMENT O 
THE AMERICAN FAMILY 3, 15-17 @avid Blankenhorn et al. eds., 1990). 
2. See, eg., MARY A. GLENDON, RIE TRANSFORMATION w FAMILY LAW: STATE, 
LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1989) (highlight- 
ing individualist thrust of U.S. family law and identifying a general trend, in U.S. 
and in Europe, towards dejuridification of marriage); NATIONAL COMM'N ON CHIL- 
DREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAhfILIEs 
18 (1991) [ h e r e i n h r  BEYOND RHETORIC] (stating that America has the highest 
divorce rate in the world); Meulders-Klein, supm note 1, at 654-56. 
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dren for their parents' nonconformance to social norms. Para- 
doxically, while children's rights may be a root cause of family 
breakdown, children are also the best hope for reconstituting 
the family as a community of responsibility. 
The family, like each of the communities explored in this 
symposium, illustrates the potential oppressiveness of individu- 
alism untempered by concern for the group and of communita- 
rianism untempered by respect for the individual. Indeed, both 
individual and group are threatened when either of them lacks 
a dimension of the other, and the existence of that shared di- 
mension is essential t o  their continued vitality. I believe that 
our concern for children can provide that dimension. In com- 
mitment to the next generation, individual and group, self and 
other, meet. Moreover, this concern for children can play a 
pivotal role not only within the family, the most basic commu- 
nity, but also in the larger social and political communities 
that surround and define families and individuals. 
Children, even more than adults, illustrate the dilemmas 
of freedom-within-community that have been a recurrent theme 
of this symposium. For children, connection to others is a pre- 
condition to autonomy and individuality. From this truth flows 
a paradox: Can we give adults the autonomy t o  define and 
restructure their families without undermining family stabili- 
ty-the very stability that nurtures a child's growth into an au- 
tonomous adult? Can we protect vulnerable children born into 
nontraditional families, by protecting their functional relation- 
ships of care without, a t  the same time, undermining the for- 
mal marital family-the institution traditionally entrusted with 
protecting society's vulnerable members? 
Professor Meulders-Klein poses a number of key questions 
about the tensions between family, state and individual in 
Western European law.3 America is wrestling with its own 
variations on these themes. Is the family an intermediate 
group with values distinct from the individual's  interest^?^ If 
so, what is the family's relation to its individual members, 
other intermediate communities, and the state? And finally, the 
3. Meulders-Klein, supra note 1, at 645. 
4. Professor Meulders-Klein highlights European law's explicit grant of special 
status to the family, which distinguishes it dramatically from American law. Where 
the U.S. Constitution is silent, many European laws and constitutions acknowledge 
that family has value distinct from individual privacy interests or adult personal 
growth. See id. at 683. 
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quintessential New World puzzle, how do we define or redefine 
"family"? Of particular concern to Americans is determining the 
balance, in deciding what constitutes a family, between formal 
legal tradition and informal and evolving custom. 
At the close of her paper, Professor Meulders-Klein offers a 
metaphor that seems t o  capture the dilemmas posed by individ- 
ualism in families and diverse family forms in pluralist societ- 
ies. Wow can an orchestra hope to play a symphony," she asks, 
"if each musician wishes to perform as a soloist?'" I fmd her 
metaphor has several layers of meaning. Imagine an orchestra 
bristling with every imaginable instrument in which no player 
feels compelled to follow the conductor or read from the same 
score. Yet what kind of music would be produced if every play- 
er piped the identical melody on the same type of instrument? 
Clearly, the richness and vitality of families and communities 
depends not only on a diversity of voices, but on some shared 
understanding of the individual's responsibilities to the group 
and each player's part in the collaborative enterpri~e.~ Can we 
foster harmony and improvisation, interweave new or seeming- 
ly dissonant voices, without surrendering to cacophony? 
From where I stand-looking out upon the ivory towers 
and housing projects, the houses of worship and crack houses, 
the bustling neighborhoods and empty lots of West Philadel- 
phia-I see the United States as a society both challenged and 
defined by its cultural, ethnic, regional, class and religious 
diversity. Whether it is possible to join such a diversity of 
voices in a common theme is a matter of great debate among 
Americans. Depending on one's perspective, recent changes in 
family law to accommodate new family structures may be 
viewed as an unalloyed threat to family or an indication of 
family law's continuing vitality. 
I confess that I am an optimist. I see the erosion of tradi- 
tional family forms as related not solely to self-centered indi- 
vidualism, but also to an evolving social concern for the needs 
and rights of vulnerable family members, especially children. I 
see legal recognition of de facto marriage not purely as evi- 
dence of family breakdown, but also as  playing an  important 
5. Id. at 691. 
6. See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and th.e Transformation of 
American Family Law, 83 ~ C H .  L. REV. 1803, 1877-79 (1985) (suggesting that 
some commonality of belief about central moral issues of family law is necessary to 
society). 
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role in preserving and reconstituting families to meet their 
dependent members' needs. Where others may identify legal 
recognition of nontraditional families as an aspect of American 
libertarian individualism, I discern an equally American quest 
for a pragmatic re-invention of family to incorporate changing 
ideals. 
Many observers describe America as having its own brand 
of libertariaddemocratic individualism in family  matter^.^ 
From America's beginnings, however, public intervention in an 
effort to protect and guide children and t o  shape families to an 
Americanized model has provided a strong counter theme to 
individualism. Even in colonial times, communities often exert- 
ed stringent oversight of child-rearing and conjugal relations.' 
The Industrial Revolution ushered in state intervention on a 
massive scale, and by the early twentieth century, community 
policies regarding families found expression in labor, child 
protective, and compulsory schooling laws.' Indeed, because 
American regulation of the family has taken so many forms, i t  
is easy to attribute too much weight to the declining impor- 
tance of formal marriage as evidence of rising legal tolerance 
for individualism, and to overlook the communitarian thrust of 
much public law regulating de facto and nonmarital families.'' 
7. See, e.g., MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITI- 
CAL DISCOURSE 48, 125 (1991) (describing a legacy of libertarian individualism in 
the American image of the "lone rights-bearer" and relating this legacy to a "miss- 
ing dimension of sociality," reflected in invisibility of children in public discourse); 
MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINE- 
TEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 26 (1985) (quoting Alexis de Tocqueville's early 19th 
century observations on the "democratic" family's individualism). 
8. See, e.g., GROSSBERG, supra note 7, at  4-5; ED- S. MORGAN, THE PURI- 
TAN FAMILY: RELIGION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY NEW 
ENGLAND (rev. ed. 1966). 
9. See LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF TEIEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HIS- 
TORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE, B O ~ N  1880-1960 (1988) (discussing child protective 
laws); STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESITC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL Hrm- 
RY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 119, 128 (1988) (discussing 'progressive" reforms and 
organized state inkwention); Barbara B. Woodhouse, W h  Owns the Child?? 
Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1038- 
41 (1992) (discussing rise of children's rights movement and child protective laws); 
id. at  1059-68 (discussing child labor laws). 
10. I use the term "de facto" to describe persons who may lack blood or legal 
ties to each other but are tied together by functional relationships of care and 
affection. De facto families may be composed of committed same sex couples, het- 
erosexual cohabitants, children's "psychological parents" (those whom children iden- 
tify as their primary parenting figures), extended family, and others who function 
as family but do not necessarily fall within the traditional norms. See Barbara B. 
Woodhouse, Towards a Revitalization of Family Law, 69 TM. L. REV. 245, 282 
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Perhaps my view is colored by my intensive exposure to 
law as practiced in the Dependency Branch of Philadelphia's 
Family Court, which deals mostly with poor families rather 
than the propertied families that populate traditional texts on 
family law." From the perspective of a children's advocate in 
a troubled inner city, American law is far from laissez-faire. 
When looking a t  contemporary America, it is difficult to main- 
tain the fiction of family autonomy. One sees law regulating 
families intensively, but not through prescriptive norms for 
entry and exit from marriage. From the legislature to law en- 
forcement agencies, the American legal system is now in the 
business of crisis intervention. Family courts are inundated 
with the casualties of domestic violence, child abuse, neglect, 
family break-up, truancy, and disputes over custody, paternity, 
and child support.12 As American law has expanded to protect 
all children, not just rich or marital children, these family 
courts have become equal opportunity centers for disaster re- 
lief. They do not discriminate on the basis of legal parentage o r  
(1990) (reviewing GLENDON, supm note 2) (proposing that we shift our focus from 
whether people look like a family to whether they act like one). 
11. Every city (or county) has its own version of the Dependency C o u r t a  
court that takes jurisdiction of cases involving children in crisis. Children come 
into the system through many different routes, including temporary foster care 
placements by overburdened parents, reports of abuse or neglect, children's medical 
or educational needs, school truancy, or brushes with juvenile law. In 1989, 
Philadelphia's overburdened Dependency Court heard 36,000 cases of abuse and 
neglect, truancy, incorrigibility, and mental health, allocating less than 15 minutes 
to 90% of the cases heard. PHILADELPHIA C m ~ s  FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH, 
DEPENDENCY COURTWATCH P ~ m m  s (1990). 
I owe any insights I can claim in this area to Philadelphia's active family ad- 
vocacy community. Attorneys h m  the Juvenile Law Center, Support Center for 
Child Advocates, the City Solicitors Office, the Public Defenders and Community 
Legal Services all have shared their expertise with me and my students, as have 
advocates &om Philadelphia Citizens for Children and Youth, the Philadelphia 
Children's Network, and Pennsylvania Partnership for Children. Without their 
invaluable contributions as collaborators and teachers, my project of building a 
family policy cumiculum around a realistic abuse and neglect case study would not 
have been possible. I am indebted also to the students and clinicians from our 
P ~ M  Law Clinic and Public Service Program who have shared their thorniest child 
support, paternity, and custody cases with me in seminar papers and consultations. 
12. America has the highest divorce rate in the world-at present rates, half of 
all U.S. marriages can be expected t o  end in divorce, involving a million children 
per year in legal dissolution of their parents' marriages. Another million children 
annually are born to single mothers. BEYOND RHE~YIRIC, supm note 2, at 18-19. 
Moreover, children whose families are disrupted by poverty, abuse and neglect have 
overwhelmed many state child welfare systems, and the National Commission on 
Children estimates that 550,000 children will be in out-of-home placements by 
1995. See id at 283-85. 
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marital status. The courts and agencies that deal with families 
in crisis, poor people, and children at  risk apply the same rules 
to marital and nonmarital children alike. Spurred by pragma- 
tism, they increasingly adopt policies that recognize and at- 
tempt to support children's de facto and extended families. 
In America, children's rights have been instrumental in 
undercutting the significance of formal marriage. Custody laws 
that once assigned virtual ownership of children to their fa- 
thers now recognize that children are not chattel and that 
custody rules must be structured to place the interest of chil- 
dren first.13 Divorce is now a real option for American moth- 
ers, as it is possible for them to leave7unhappy marriages with- 
out also losing custody of and support for their children.14 Sta- 
tutes and judicial decisions applying constitutional principles 
have broken down the boundaries between marital and non- 
marital unions by refusing to recognize many traditional dis- 
tinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children.15 Thus, 
whether a child's father was married to her mother has no 
bearing on the child's entitlement to support. 
In recognition of children's need for continuity, state and 
federal policies often provide that children under state care 
should be placed by preference with family members or persons 
who know them, even if not related to the child by blood or 
legal ties.16 Kinship foster care programs have expanded the 
boundaries of the foster family by placing children with marital 
13. See GROSSBERG, supra note 7, at  237-53 (creation of the best-interests-of- 
the-child doctrine); MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 9, at  127 (best interests of the 
child a decisive factor in awarding custody); Woodhouse, supra note 9, at  1038-41, 
1050-59 (emergence of children's rights and best interest standard). 
14. See GROSSBERG, supm note 7, at 250 (discussing changing economics of di- 
vorce); M m  & KELLOGG, supm note 9, at 129 & n.70 (noting evolution of moral 
obligation into legal obligation of support). Although Americans have been compara- 
tively free to avoid long-term responsibilities for children and former spouses, this 
may be changing with recent reforms in child support levels and new methods of 
collection and enforcement. BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 2, at 97-104; see also 
IRWIN GARFINKEL, ASSURING CHILD SUPPORT: AN EXTENSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
(1992) (proposing new plans for enforcement and insuring all children receive a 
minimum payment). 
15. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (protecting family 
relationship between unmarried father and his children); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding unconstitutional a state law that barred illegitimates 
from bringing wrongful death suits). 
16. See, e.g., 20 Pa. Bull. 112, Rev. Local Court Rule 1676 (1990) (court is 
directed to consider placements that would provide familiar surroundings and care- 
takers); Elizabeth Killackey, Kinship Foster Care, 26 FAM. L.Q. 211, 214 (1992) . 
(state statutes encourage placement with relatives). 
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and nonmarital grandparents, aunts, and  cousin^.^' Moreover, 
kinship foster care has expanded communal responsibility for 
families by subsidizing de facto caregivers of children. In some 
jurisdictions, even the strong taboos about recognizing gay and 
lesbian unions are subordinated to the pressing need for foster 
care and the interests in protecting de facto as well as biologi- 
cal parent-child relationships.18 The needs of children have 
inexorably forced us to work with their real, functional fami- 
lies, and not the formal family described by traditional law. 
These changes, in my view, indicate a necessary recognition of 
the reality faced by today's children, and they illustrate the 
many ways that informal communities adapt to provide "fami- 
lies" that can support and nurture vulnerable i n d i ~ i d u a l s . ~ ~  
Much of this change is occurring at the grass roots level, in 
municipal ordinances and family courts that issue few pub- 
lished decisions. In true common law fashion, American family 
law is trickling up as well as down. In areas ranging from 
reproductive technology to abortion, from child custody to pa- 
ternity, from alimony to child support, the American legal sys- 
tem is struggling to  strike a proper balance between commmu- 
nitarian values and individual rights.20 Like many state 
17. Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125 (1979) (construing 42 U.S.C. 5 608 as 
requiring equal funding of kinship foster care programs for poor children); M.A. 
Farber, A Growing Foster-Care Program Is Fraught with Ills, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 
1990, at  B1 (in 1990 42% of the 45,500 foster children in New York City were in 
kinship placements). 
18. See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 30 (N.Y. 1991) (Kaye, J., dis- 
senting from ruling denying lesbian partner status as child's de fado parent); In re 
Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sur. Ct. 1992) (approving adoption by lesbian 
co-parent based on child's interest in sustaining relationship); Donna J. Hitchens et 
al., Family Law, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW # 1.04[2] (National Law. 
Guild, Supp. 1992) (noting roles of gay and lesbian foster and adoptive parents in 
finding homes for hard-to-place children and gay adolescents); id. # 1.03[1][al, at 1- 
11 n.19 (noting cases that find continued custody or visitation with gay or lesbian 
parent is in child's best interest). 
19. For a classic account of such adaptation, see CAROL B. STACK, W OUR 
STFM"I'GIES FOR m V I V A L  IN A BLACK COMMUNITY (1974). 
20. For example, courts and legislatures deciding whether to enforce surrogacy 
contracts must balance the individual's reproductive autonomy against the integrity 
of the family as a social institution. See, e.g., In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1246- 
50 WJ. 1988) (rejecting surrogacy contract as violating public policy against com- 
modification of parent-child relationships). In addressing issues of child support, 
stepparent adoptions, and relocation of custodial parents, judges and legislatures 
must harmonize personal liberties with the needs of post-divorce family and the 
competing interests of reconstituted families. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 
246 (1978) (placing unity of family seeking stepparent adoption above biological 
father's claims of individual right); Lozinak v. Lozinak, 569 A.2d 353 (Pa. Super. 
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courts and legislatures, the Supreme Court continues to thrash 
out many threshold questions. Some recent decisions suggest 
greater attention to the interplay of individual and group inter- 
ests in shaping family policy. 
The Supreme Court's 1992 abortion ruling in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey,2l and the lesser known 1989 case, Mi- 
chael H. v. Gerald D.,22 are two examples of decisions in 
which the tensions between individual rights and the family as 
a community are central issues. In Casey, the Supreme Court 
rearmed its position that women's reproductive freedom is a 
constitutionally protected privacy right--a position that, in 
focusing on the individual woman's autonomy, represents a 
relatively individualist interpretation of family rights.23 But 
the Court qualified its holding by recognizing a societal interest 
in protecting potential life that could justify regulations of 
abortion as long as they did not create an "undue burden" on 
the abortion decision itself." 
As an advocate for choice, I welcomed Casey's reaffirmation 
that women, as those who take the risks and pains of pregnan- 
cy and childbirth, must be the ones to make the critical choices 
about reproduction. As an advocate for children, however, I 
welcomed Casey's affirmation that future generations are the 
community's concern and responsibility as well as the 
individual's. Casting reproduction as a purely private enter- 
prise had the advantage of establishing a zone of deregulation 
around reproductive choice, protecting women from destructive 
and demeaning intrusions. But this laissez-faire, individualist 
description also tended to devalue and commodify children and 
made it harder to frame the work of bearing and rearing chil- 
dren as a critical shared concern, calling for meaningful sup- 
Ct.) (allowing child's interest in maintaining network of family contacts to outweigh 
motheis interest in relocating with a new husband), appeal denied, 590 A.2d 758 
(Pa 1990); GARFINKEL, supra note 14, at 74 (reviewing debate about aggressive en- 
forcement of fathers' obligations to children with whom they no longer live). These 
examples illustrate law's increasing attention to the interco~ectedness of individu- 
als within families, even &r divorce. See Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the 
Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747 
(1993) (arguing that the law's traditional focus on "rightsu of isolated parentchild 
dyads fails to capture the complex reality of family interdependence). 
21. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
22. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
23. Cosey, 112 S. Ct. at  2812 (plurality opinion) (describing Roe as standing for 
a woman's personal autonomy). 
24. Id at 2817, 2819 (plurality opinion). 
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port t o  mothers, infants and families.25 
Casey has been criticized as opening the door to acrimoni- 
ous disputes, as states push to discover the limits of the "undue 
burden" standard articulated in the plurality opinion.26 Per- 
haps, however, there is something to be gained from such a 
dialogue, if it  serves to expand discussion about the dualities of 
pregnancy and parenthood and about family and children, as 
an individual choice, a complex relationship, and a community 
value. In its own way, then, Casey may signal an era in which 
the American people grapple with more complex descriptions of 
our selves and each other as autonomous individuals embedded 
in interconnected communities of responsibility and care. I t  
remains to be seen whether courts and legislatures will inter- 
pret the undue burden test with sensitivity to women's real 
experiences or with more than rhetorical concern for potential 
Like the Casey court, the Court in Michael H.28 addressed 
25. Cf. ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, FEMINISM WITHOW ILLUSIONS: A CRITIQUE 
OF INDIVIDUALISM 83 (1991) (contending that casting abortion as a woman's individ- 
ual privacy right tended to dissolve men's responsibility to the next generation); 
Barbara B. Woodhouse, Poor Mothers, Poor Babies: Law, Medicine, and Crack, in 
CHILD, PARENT, AND STATE: LAW AND POLICY READER (S. Randall Humm et al. 
eds., forthcoming 1994) (arguing that, in our national obsession with abortion, we 
fail to recognize the shared interests of mothers, infants and the community in a 
healthy start and fail to give meaningful support to pregnant women and young 
families). 
26. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, America's Longest W a c  At 20, Roe Conflict Enters 
New Era, WASH. PO^, Jan. 22, 1993, at  Al, A16. 
27. In considering the husband notification provision in Casey, for example, the 
plurality gave substantial weight to women's real life experiences of battering and 
domestic violence. 112 S. Ct. at 2831. The burden 6f a 24-hour waiting period, 
which the plurality did not find facially invalid in Casey, id. at  2825-26, may con- 
stitute a substantial obstacle to choice for women in communities where they must 
travel hundreds of miles or run a gauntlet of violent protesters to reach a clinic. 
See Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 113 S. Ct. 1668, 1669 (1993) (O'Connor, 
J., concumng) (stating that a provision in an abortion law does not satisfy the 
undue burden test and is facially invalid if the provision operates as a substantial 
obstacle to a woman's choice in a large fraction of the cases in which the provision 
is applicable). 
Similarly, legislative concern for potential life rings hollow in cities like Phila- 
delphia where lack of prenatal care, drug epidemics, homelessness, and lack of 
immunizations contribute to infant mortality rates above those of many third world 
countries. See PHILADELPHIA CITIZENS FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH, OUR VILLAGE, 
OUR CHILDREN 14-16 (1991) (reporting rising infant mortality rates, especially in 
minority neighborhoods where mothers were four times as likely to receive inade- 
quate prenatal care). Nationally, one in four women goes without adequate prena- 
tal care. See BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 2, a t  123. 
28. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion). For additional discussions of Mi- 
chael H. and the "unitary family," see Bruce C. Hafen, Zndiuidualism and Autono- 
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the tension between individual and community interests-this 
time while unravelling a complex story of tangled family rela- 
tionships. The case involved a married woman who conceived a 
child during an extramarital affair but later reconciled with her 
husband and wished to keep the marriage intact.29 The couple 
opposed a petition by the woman's lover, Michael H., to estab- 
lish his biological paternity of the Michael challenged 
the California law that permitted them to veto his attempt to 
show biological paternity?' Thus, Michael H. pitted an indi- 
vidualist version of family rights that focused on a natural pa- 
rent's rights in his offspring against the communitarian value 
of the family as a functioning social entity. 
The Court fractured along almost as many lines as there 
are Justices, unable to agree as to whether something called 
the "unitary family" exists and may be given precedence over 
the biological father's individual claims of family right, and if 
so, whether the "unitary family" is grounded in traditional 
rights attaching to marital status or in some more flexible 
definition of family.32 Michael H., for all its doctrinal and 
philosophical confusion, opens a discussion about individual 
liberty in tension with group mutuality and interdependence 
and about the meaning of functional family relationships when 
they conflict with formal notions of status and right. Both 
Casey and Michael H. raise more questions than they resolve, 
but I interpret these decisions as evidence of an increased at- 
tention to family as a social entity and public value, as well as 
an aspect of individual privacy and autonomy. 
In the public policy arena, despite America's romance with 
rights and our rhetorical appeals t o  family values, Americans 
show greater ambivalence about granting positive economic and 
social rights to families, mothers and children than their Euro- 
pean counterparts. The tensions between o u r  ideals of commu- 
nity and our legacy of rugged individualism and reliance on 
private responsibility, compounded by economic crisis, have 
my in Family Law: The Waning of Belonging, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18-23; Wood- 
house, supra note 20. See also Katharine T.  Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 
YALE L.J. 293 (1988) (discussing custody disputes in which one biological parent 
seeks to deny parental status to the other). 
29. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113-15. 
30. Id. at 115-16. 
31. Id. at 117-18. 
32. Compare id. at 123-27 & n.3 (plurality opinion) with id. at 142-46 
( B r e ~ a n ,  J., dissenting). 
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been played out in cases and policies surrounding the state's 
responsibility to children in foster care.33 Torn between con- 
cern for the community's children and a fear of undermining 
individual responsibility, America is still searching for a moral- 
ly acceptable and politically practical theory that defines the 
state's obligations to children.34 Two 1991 reports issued by 
the National Commission on Children, however, suggest a 
movement towards a partnership between public and private 
responsibility for children.35 The first of these reports is a 
comprehensive study combined with a policy agenda, revealing- 
ly, if not optimistically, entitled Beyond Rhetoric. I t  chronicles 
the status of children in America and proposes a range of policy 
initiatives to strengthen and support families such as govern- 
ment insured child support, community-based day care, and 
comprehensive prenatal care. The second report is a survey of 
children's and parents' views entitled Speaking of Kids. This 
survey analyzes key issues of family life with data drawn from 
a large, representative sample of parents and children of di- 
verse class, race, region, and family type.36 
Both of these reports serve as barometers of the contempo- 
33. See, eg., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 
189 (1989) (rejecting due process claim that state owed duty of protection to 
abused child); Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374, 1381 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting 
claim of children's positive right to be placed in kinship foster families). Debates 
regarding kinship foster care illustrate the irreducible tensions between individual 
and community responsibility for children. Critics claim that programs which subsi- 
dize relatives who take in abused or neglected children undermine families by 
paying them to do what they would do for free, while supporters contend that they 
preserve family ties of children who would otherwise be placed, also at taxpayers' 
expense, with strangers. See Farber, supra note 17, at  B4. 
34. See, e.g., DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN 
FAMILY 134-35 (1988) (discussing ambivalence in welfare reform about helping 
children by helping their single-parent families); W. NORTON GRUBB & MARVIN 
WERSON, BROKEN PROMISES: HOW AMERICANS FAIL THEIR CHILDREN 301 (1988) 
(discussing the limitation of purely redistributive welfare programs in correcting 
poverty in capitalist labor markets). 
35. BNOND RHETORIC, supra note 2; NATIONAL COMM'N ON CHILDREN, SPEAK- 
ING OF KIDS: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF CHILDREN AND PARENTS (1991) [hereinafter 
SPEAKING OF KIDS]. 
36. Parents and children are, of course, the real experts on family. There is a 
new interest among social scientists, and even politicians, in discovering what chil- 
dren think about their lives, their families and their place in society. See, e.g., 
ADRIAN FURNHAM & BARRIE STACEY, YOUNG PEOPLE'S UNDERSTANDING OF SOCIETY 
(1991) (collecting studies on youths' perceptions); Woodhouse, supra note 20 (dis- 
cussing the importance of children's perspectives); President Clinton: Answering 
Children's Questions (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 20, 1993) (seeking children's 
views on crime, education, environment, and family issues). 
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rary meaning of family, and I suggest they depict an America 
that is groping towards a new consensus on the value of chil- 
dren. This evolving consensus recognizes that children not only 
enhance the personal growth and enjoyment of adults, but also 
that they are individuals in their own right and are vital com- 
munity and national resources. Speaking of Kids tells a sur- 
prising story about families; in spite of everything we read 
about the death of family life, most children and parents, and 
this is equally true in single as well as two-parent families, 
share deep emotional ties, strive to spend time together, and 
sacrifice for each other's good.37 
Families of all types express worries about crime, lack of 
money, too little time, and an uncertain economic future- 
worries that are profoundly felt in poor inner-city neighbor- 
hoods where deficits of economic and social capital are com- 
pounded by deficits in community reso~rces.~' Children, con- 
trary to common belief, continue to admire and respect their 
parents (and grandparents) and know that their parents love 
them. Most parents and most children worry about families 
generally but feel that their family is functioning pr~perly.~' 
Perhaps my optimism is justified and a consensus on a common 
theme of family unity and intergenerational support is possible 
after all. 
Others, however, might be less optimistic. Whether they 
attribute America's shortcomings to individual or public derelic- 
tion, critics could point to  ample proof that Americans do not 
really care about their children. In a society in which most 
mothers work outside the home, affordable day care is scarce or 
non-existent.*' Until recently, national legislation established 
37. SPEAKING OF KIDS, supra note 35, at 10-22 (reporting many measures of 
family closeness and involvement but noting children feel less loved by absent 
fathers); Mark Mellman et al., Family Time, Family Values, in REBUILDING THE 
N ~ s r ,  supra note 1, at 73, 73-92 (research finding that family is central value in 
most Americans' lives). 
38. These worries are shared equally by inner-city single and two-parent fami- 
lies, confirming that deficits and risks the media and politicians often attribute to 
family structure are linked to broader social-structural deficits. SPEAKING OF KIDS, 
supm note 35, at 24-39; see also Loic J.D. Wacquant & William J. Wilson, The 
Cost of Racial and Class Exclusion in the Inner City, 501 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 8, 11-16 (1989) (noting cumulative effects on families of deficits of eco- 
nomic and social capital in inner-city areas of concentrated poverty). 
39. SPEAKING OF KIDS, supra note 35, at 9-10; Mellman et al., supra note 37, 
at 74. 
40. See, e.g., BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 2, at 266 (affordable child care in 
short supply); Barbara B .  Woodhouse, Uncle Sam Exploits Moms, Too, PHILA. IN- 
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no right to even unpaid leave for mothers giving birth or caring 
for sick ~hildren.~' Thirteen percent of American children are 
without public or private health insurance; programs like Head 
Start, WIC food supplements, Aid for Dependent Children, and 
programs providing early childhood intervention for at risk 
children and assistance to dependent children and their fami- 
lies are consistently u n d e r f ~ n d e d . ~ ~  A significant proportion of 
our children are growing up without the support and care of 
two parents.43 
The National Commission on Children studies also tell us 
that too many American children begin life "at risk." Today, 
one in four pregnant mothers in America does not receive early 
prenatal care and one in five children lives below the poverty 
line.44 In contrast to Europe, where income supports reach 
almost all children, a signif~cant percentage of poor American 
children receive no income assistance and five million live in 
families with incomes less than half the federal poverty line.45 
The Commissioners in Beyond Rhetoric noted that children are 
now the poorest Americans. The poverty rate for young families 
has doubled in the past twenty years46 while elderly citizens, 
childless couples, and single individuals have grown more afflu- 
ent.47 The Commissioners concluded, "we could not avoid 
questioning the moral character of a nation that allows so 
Q-R, Feb. 18, 1993, at A15 (critiquing lack of public support for mothers who 
carry double burden of wage earning and child care). 
41. After seven years of struggle, the Family and Medical Leave Ad was final- 
ly passed on February 5, 1993, in the opening weeks of the Clinton administration. 
See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6. Provid- 
ing only 12 weeks of unpaid leave, this reform still leaves American families far 
behind their European counterparts for whom extended paid leave is routine. See 
S. REP. NO. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 21-22; 
Meulders-Klein, supra note 1, a t  672. 
42. BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 2, at 89-93 (inadequacy of current welfare 
subsidies); id. at 191-92 (underfunding of Head Start); id. at 151 (underfunding of 
W E ) ;  id. at 137 (uninsured children). 
43. Id. at 18, 97 (noting that in 1989, 25% of American children (16 million) 
lived in single parent households and that more than one-third of absent parents 
paid no support); SPEAKING OF KIDS, supra note 35, at 22 (more than half of ab- 
sent fathers saw children less than once a month; 36% saw less than once a year). 
44. BEYOND RHETORIC, supm note 2, a t  82, 123. 
45. Id. at 24-25; Timothy M. Smeeding & Barbara B. Torrey, Poor Children in 
Rich Countries, 242 SCI. 873 (1988). 
46. BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 2, at 83 (noting that greatest increases in 
poverty have been in young white families and young married couples with chil- 
dren). 
47. Id. at 80-82. 
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many children to grow up poor, to live in unsafe dwellings and 
violent neighborhoods, and to lack access to basic health care 
and a decent ed~cat ion ."~~ 
What is the future of families in America? Let us assume 
that Americans can overcome the hurdle of accepting that the 
family as an entity embodies special values that are distinct 
from individual rights and autonomy. Assume further that we 
can agree that family is a matter of community and individual 
concern that calls for community support as well as  individual 
responsibility. What next? To borrow from Professor Meulders- 
Klein's concluding discussion, the question for Americans, as it 
is for people everywhere, is whether we can develop a consen- 
sus on certain "essential values" that is sufficient to give demo- 
cratic content and definition to the term "family.'Mg 
While Professor Meulders-Klein in her address wisely 
avoided this thicket, I can not resist the temptation to make a 
few observations about the infamous phrase "family values." As 
everyone knows, family values became a watchword in Ameri- 
ca's 1992 presidential campaign. During the summer of 1992, I 
met with two scholars who had arrived from Konstanz, Germa- 
ny to study this peculiar American phenomenon. At one ex- 
treme in the debate, they observed, family values seemed to be 
a description of what a family is not. Family is not gay or lesbi- 
an people; it is not single mothers or fathers, regardless of how 
seriously they take their responsibilities t o  the community and 
to  each other. At the other extreme, they concluded, family was 
entirely a matter of personal choice-anything Americans 
wanted it to be. These scholars were puzzled that many Ameri- 
cans seemed to yearn for a golden age of family in which the 
privacy of the home was sacrosanct, creating-and they drew 
on Christopher Lasch's poignant phrase-a "haven in a heart- 
less 
My reading of history leads me to believe that the exis- 
tence of a golden age of the private sheltering family is largely 
a mythical notion-family law has always been shaped by so- 
cial and political forces, and legal families have always been 
what their respective societies wanted them to be.51 In other 
48. Id at moriv. 
49. Meulders-Klein, supra note 1, at 691. 
50. C H R I ~ P H E R  LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED 
(1977). 
51. See, e.g., STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMI- 
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ages, the unifying theme of the legal family was as likely to be 
protection of property or patrimony as a mandate of natural 
law or concern for family values. As women and children know 
best, family privacy can be oppressive as well as p r ~ t e c t i v e . ~ ~  
Modern law has changed and adapted because change was 
needed. 
Increasingly, I believe the catalyst for change and the 
unifying theme of family law and policy is child- 
ren-specifically, the dignity and worth of children. Children 
may be central players in the demolition of the traditional 
family, but they are also the greatest hope for revitalization 
and reconstitution of the family. The erosion of the traditional 
family through increased recognition of cohabitation and re- 
duced sanctions for illegitimacy h& occurred, not because of 
hostility toward the family, but because of a growing reluctance 
t o  use children instrumentally by stigmatizing and disabling 
them in an attempt to influence their parent's conduct. Like- 
wise, the growth of the welfare state reflects an unwillingness 
to see the community's children and their caregivers stunted 
and destroyed by poverty, not an ideology that individuals 
should be liberated from responsibility. State protective inter- 
vention in families, for all its shortcomings, has not been driv- 
en by an ideological conviction that the state is a better parent 
s o  much as by a concern that children should not be sacrificed 
t o  an ideology of family unity in those exceptional cases in  
which parents abdicate their responsibility or abuse their au- 
thority. 
Some identify women's increasing independence and equal- 
ity as the driving force behind family change. I am not per- 
suaded. Women's dependency is not inherent-it has always 
been a function of their responsibility for children. Modern 
American women, like women the world over, work not only to 
support themselves, but also to support their families. The over 
seventy percent of American mothers with young children who 
LIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 8-9 (1992) (challenging "golden age of family" myth); 
Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything that Grows? Toward a History of 
Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 819 (critiquing traditional family law history and 
asserting an alternative view of the development of family law); Woodhouse, supra 
note 9 (describing interplay of law, politics and culture in genesis of parents' and 
children's rights). 
52. See GLENDON, supra note 2, at 147 ("Stamped on the reverse side of the 
coinage of individual liberty, family privacy, and sex equality, are alienation, pow- 
erlessness, and dependency."). 
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work outside the home also work a second shift within the 
home.53 The feminization of poverty, dramatized by writers 
like Lenore WeitzmanF4 relates directly to women's greater 
burden of care for children, the unpaid work they do, and the 
sacrifices in earning power they must make in order to meet 
their family's needs. Policymakers increasingly recognize that a 
society cannot care for its children without addressing the 
needs of their caregivers, who must either be subsidized a t  
home or given the support they need to participate in the labor 
market as breadwinners. Support, both private and public, for 
homemakers and working custodial parents is neither a perpet- 
uation of dependency nor a liberation from responsibility. Rath- 
er, such support is a recognition that, if children are to receive 
adequate care and nurture in a changing society, we must all 
share in the work of child-rearing that is now disproportion- 
ately shouldered by women. 
In the struggle to balance individualism with communitari- 
anism, the question remains whether that support ought to 
come from family members, binding the individual, or from the 
state, liberating the individual but binding the community. In 
responding to this question, I agree with Professor Meulders- 
Klein's analysis: the choice between collective and individual 
responsibility is a false dichotomy-family values call for 
both.55 I believe the choice between the traditional family and 
unbridled individualism is also a false dichotomy. In fact, both 
tradition and responsible individualism shape the changing 
relationship between state, individual and family. 
One need not uncritically accept all groups as families in 
order to tap the resources flowing from diverse family forms.56 
We can draw upon common values, such as those of "family 
unity" and "family life" that Professor Meulders-Klein describes 
in European law," to construct a less formal and more func- 
53. BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 2, at 21-23 (over 74% of mothers with chil- 
dren between the ages of 6 and 13, and 58% of those with children under 6,  were 
working or looking for work in 1990, most of them full time); see also ARLIE 
HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORRING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT 
HOME (1989) (accounts of women's disadvantage even in two-earner families and 
their difficulties in balancing demands of work and family). 
54. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNMPECTED SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC ONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985). 
55. Meulders-Klein, supra note 1, a t  674-75. 
56. A recent New Yorker cartoon depicts four new groups claiming family sta- 
tus, including "Guy, Chair, Three-Way Lamp." Roz Chast, More Nontraditional 
Family Units, NEW YORKER, Oct. 12, 1992, a t  73. 
57. Meulders-Klein, supra note 1, at 683-84; see also supra notes 37-39 and 
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tional definition of family. Family should continue to be defined 
by mutual care, self-sacrifice, and lasting cross-generational 
and intergenerational c~rnmi tment .~~ However, a certain oth- 
er-regarding individualism, in the form of respect for the indi- 
vidual dignity of children, also has its place. In contrast to self- 
centered individualism, a regard for children's individual digni- 
ty calls for an approach to defining family that goes beyond 
whether adults have conformed to formal procedures or fol- 
lowed traditional norms in  establishing their family. In place of 
a structure that sacrifices individual children to accomplish 
social stability, we are beginning to erect a more humane struc- 
ture for social stability. The new foundation of this structure is 
a community ethos that values children enough to accept them 
as meaningful members of our society, assign individual re- 
sponsibility for their nurture and care, protect their family ties, 
and give meaningful support to their caregivers. This new 
appreciation of children, not some revolt of childhood or the 
right of children to sue their parents, is the real motivation 
behind the evolution of children's rights in American law and 
policy as well as in the international 
I am reminded of the scene in the film Romancing the 
Stone where the heroine, in  mangled high heeled shoes, begins 
inching across a rickety rope bridge stretched across a jungle 
canyon. Before her is the treacherous bridge; below her, a 
chasm. She hesitates, but only momentarily, for behind her is a 
band of machete-wielding and Uzi-armed bandits. She has no 
choice but to go forward. Like the heroine, we may be terrified 
a t  the risks involved in re-defining family-in crossing the 
bridge that lies before us. But there is no turning back. We can 
no longer accept the practice of imposing sanctions on children 
in order to influence the conduct of their parents. This growing 
reluctance is seen in public policy debates about welfare re- 
form, domestic violence, child support, legitimacy, social insur- 
ance, single parenthood, and ~ohabitation.~' Children's new 
accompanying text. 
58. Woodhouse, supra note 10, at 282; cf. Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an 
Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865 (1989) (asserting that recent changes in family 
law undermine mutual care, lasting commitment, and self-sacrifice and protect only 
the autonomous self). 
59. For a discussion and analysis of children's emerging rights, see CHILDREN'S 
RIGHTS IN AMERICA: U.N. CONVENTION N THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD COMPARED 
WITH UNITED STATES LAW (Cynthia P. Cohen & Howard A. Davidson eds., 1990). 
60. This theme crosses racial, class, and political boundaries. See, e.g., MARIAN 
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status is evident in the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and its emphasis on children as individuals 
with developing capacities for autonomy who are, a t  the same 
time, deeply embedded in families, groups, and communities 
charged with their pr~tection.~' 
I suggest that we must stop wavering and press forward. 
In the post modern family, the needs of children and the value 
of adult responsibility and mutuality that are necessary to a 
child's survival are emerging as the key m @ n g  themes. We 
must reinvent families and preserve their critical functions as 
the networks of care and nurture that are a precondition, not a 
vehicle, for adult autonomy. Children, of course, are not the 
sine qua non of family, or of community. There are many fami- 
lies and communities that do not involve children. But our 
experiences as parents and children provide a template for 
relationships of responsibility and connection with another 
human being that, I would argue, is the sine qua non of fami- 
lies of all ages, compositions, and orientations as well as the 
defhtion of community. 
Let me return to Professor Meulders-Klein's evocative 
closing metaphor-the family as a symphony orchestra with 
family law as our guide to playing ensemble.62 I hope America 
can look forward to a lively symphony uniting the many diverse 
voices in our culture. I predict that the emerging redefinition of 
family may be more local and cultural than it is constitutional, 
that it will be respectful of differences, and that it will ulti- 
mately expand to include committed same sex, as well as het- 
erosexual, couples, de facto and extended, as well as nuclear 
and marital, families." We can, and I believe should, encour- 
W. EDELMAN, FAMILIES IN PERIL: AN AGENDA FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 24-30 (1987) (we 
owe children our support as a moral obligation); Blankenhorn, supm note 1, at 18- 
21 (children's welfare must be a central concern of family policy and requires pub- 
lic support); Isabel V. Sawhill, The New Paternalism: Earned Welfare, RESPONSIVE 
CO-, Spring 1992, at 26, 33 (arguing that welfare policy must not make 
children the innocent victims, while the policy stresses self-sufficiency); Lisbeth B. 
Schorr et  al., The Social-Policy Context for Families Today, in IN SUPPORT OF FAM- 
ILIES 242, 255 (Michael W. Yogrnan & T. Berry Brazelton eds., 1986) (children's 
welfare should not be sacrificed to ideology). 
61. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, reprinted in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 
IN AMERICA, supm note 59, at xi-xxxiii. 
62. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
63. On March 1, 1993, New York City began conducting registration procedures 
e ~ a b l i n g  "domestic partnerships" to receive some of the same rights of married 
couples; approximately 25 other U.S. cities, counties or states have "established 
some form of domestic partnerships or have offered parental leave or medical bene- 
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age the formation of traditional, married, two-parent families, 
not as a matter of ideology, but t o  provide children with greater 
stores of human capital and to provide caregivers with greater 
security, support, and respite in their roles as the primary 
resource for children. Ultimately, however, for the sake of chil- 
dren, our first priority must be to support and work with chil- 
dren's functional families, whatever forms they may take. We 
must afKrm family values of mutual care and help families 
meet the needs of their dependent members. 
Finally, let me add one postscript, appropriate to an inter- 
national forum. America's great civil rights leader and Nobel 
Laureate, the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., wrote in his Letter 
from a Birmingham Jail, 'We are caught in an inescapable 
network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. 
Whatever affects one directly affects all indirectly.* Econo- 
mists may argue that the single garment is woven of rational 
self-interest; libertarians may say its texture is freedom. To my 
mind, that single garment of destiny is our children-children 
who share a shrinking and increasingly interconnected world. 
Concern for their welfare provides a fitting theme for reconcili- 
ation and responsibility in the largest as well as  the smallest of 
communities. 
fits for domestic partners of unmarried government workers." Jonathan P. Hicks, A 
Legal Threshold Is Crossed by Gay Couples in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 
1993, at A15. Thus, the recognition of nontraditional families that many once 
sought in constitutional litigation, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) 
(upholding criminal sodomy law); Adam v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.) 
(denying marital status to gay couple), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982), is slowly 
being won as local political communities accept these family forms. 
64. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 1 HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT 
CHANGED THE WORLD 85 (James M. Washington ed., 1992). 
